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31 August final resubmitted version 
Collaborative Governance Arrangements to Deliver Spatially 
Coordinated Agri-Environmental Management  
Several studies show that agri-environment schemes (AES) are likely to be more effective if they 
are designed at the landscape scale. However, this requires spatial coordination of 
environmental management across multiple farm holdings and collaboration among 
governmental and other actors, including, possibly, groups of farmers. In this study we analyse 
alternative approaches to spatial coordination and collaboration. Through case studies from 
five EU member states in North West Europe we analysed collaborative governance 
arrangements, from the perspective of the distribution of governance tasks among 
collaborating actors and changes to these over time. Of these governance tasks, spatial 
coordination had our particular interest. The collaborative governance arrangements were 
shaped in various ways. In four out of five case studies a group of farmers had become involved 
in the performance of more governance tasks over time. In all cases a professional(ized) 
organisation (governmental organisation or a group of farmers) was responsible for spatial 
coordination, possibly due to the complexities inherent to a landscape approach. In relation to 
the change of schemes over time, we argue that adaptive collaborative governance, 
incorporating learning, monitoring and evaluation in the governance arrangements, is key to 
effective agri- environmental management. 
(Keywords: Agri-Environment Schemes, landscape approach, farmer groups, cooperation, 
adaptive governance.) 
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1. Introduction 
Agri-environment schemes (AES, recently renamed AECS to include climate measures) 
became a mandatory element in all EU member states’ Rural Development Plans in the 
Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) in 1994. AES are a key mechanism for supporting a wide 
range of environmental services from farmland (including biodiversity and landscape 
conservation). These schemes have evolved over the years as a result of changing public 
awareness and policy priorities, and the experience gained from their implementation. 
However, although AES payments involve €2.5 billion of EU funds per year, biodiversity in 
many rural areas is still declining rapidly (Berendse et al., 2004; Burns et al., 2016; EEA, 
2015; Flohre et al., 2011). Although research has identified some positive environmental 
impacts arising from AES, many studies agree there is need for further improvements (Batáry 
et al., 2015; de Snoo et al., 2013; Jongeneel and Polman, 2014; Kleijn et al., 2004; Kleijn et 
al., 2011; Kleijn and Sutherland, 2003). A key insight is the need to adopt a landscape scale 
approach, one that matches agri-environmental management to the spatial scale of priority 
habitats, water systems and landscape features, such as stone walls and hedges (Dwyer, 2014; 
Franks, 2011; Kleijn et al., 2011; Merckx et al., 2009; Prager et al., 2012; Westerink et al., 
2015).  
However, a landscape scale approach requires governance arrangements that are able 
to deliver cross-holding spatial coordination of environmental management (Dutton et al., 
2008; Schouten et al., 2013). This need has been acknowledged in the most recent reform of 
the CAP. AES compensation payments are now allowed to be paid to “groups of farmers, or 
groups of farmers and other land-managers” (Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013, article 28, sub-
clause 2). Thus Article 28 opens up possibilities for the development of innovative 
collaborative governance arrangements for the delivery of agri-environmental services. 
3 
 
Governance is defined as “the structures and processes by which people in societies 
make decisions and share power, creating the conditions for ordered rule and collective 
action, or institutions of social coordination” (Schultz et al., 2015, p. 7369). Collaborative 
governance can be understood as ”the processes and structures of public policy decision 
making and management that engage people constructively across the boundaries of public 
agencies, levels of government, and/ or the public, private and civic spheres in order to carry 
out a public purpose that could not otherwise be accomplished” (Emerson et al., 2012, p. 2). 
Governance arrangements for the delivery of agri-environmental management may take 
various forms, as actor networks, agri-environmental policy and institutional frameworks are 
different between countries and regions (Bamière et al., 2013; Dupraz et al., 2009; Hodge, 
2007; Westerink et al., 2015). This article analyses five case studies of collaborative 
governance arrangements drawn from different EU member states (France, Belgium, England, 
Germany and the Netherlands) to illustrate alternative approaches to delivering spatially 
coordinated agri-environmental management across farm holdings. 
 While CAP legislation is a major, it is not the only driving force behind the 
development of AES in the European Union. Governance, institutional arrangements for 
coordination and collaboration, and design of schemes are intricately related (Emery and 
Franks, 2012; Falconer, 2000; Franks, 2011; Mettepenningen et al., 2013; Westerink et al., 
2015). One aim of this article is to contribute to a better understanding of these relationships. 
Differences in environmental priorities and governance cultures have influenced the way 
individual schemes have developed (their path dependency), and means that ‘cutting and 
pasting’ entire AES from one member state or region to another is unlikely to be successful. 
However, this  review of the development path of five examples of collaborative AES 
governance aims to generate transferable lessons, taken from real world examples and 
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experiences, as innovations often spring from tailoring ideas found elsewhere to one’s own 
circumstances and needs (Barzelay, 2007). 
This comparative study is timely. Not only because of the need for AES to deliver 
environmental improvements, or because CAP-based AES can now offer higher and more 
directed payment incentives to farmers to manage their environment as members of farmer 
groups, but also because analyses of the actual organisation of spatially coordinated and/ or 
collaborative AES are not readily available (see OECD, 2013 for a recent overview). 
Scientific articles analysing collaborative governance arrangements for AES are scarce: 
despite many articles advocating spatial coordination and collaboration among farmers, few 
analyse actual case studies (examples are Steingröver et al., 2010; Westerink et al., 2015; 
Westerink et al., 2017).  
This article analyses the variety of collaborative governance arrangements used to 
deliver spatially coordinated agri-environmental management in different EU member states. 
The next section presents our conceptual framework; this is followed by the methods used. 
The case studies are described with reference to the annex with supplementary material. The 
discussion analyses the change in the distribution of the AES-related governance tasks 
between actors over the duration of the case study. It also analyses how the governance task 
of spatial coordination is implemented in the various settings and considers the extent to 
which current governance arrangements have been informed by previous experiences. 
 
2. Conceptual framework  
Landscape approach and spatial coordination 
From the perspective of ecosystem functioning and services, there are good reasons to strive 
for spatial coordination of agri-environmental management across farm holdings within a 
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landscape. Various ecosystem services targeted by agri-environmental policies, such as water 
quality and storage, wildlife conservation and the protection of cultural landscape structures, 
are more connected to the landscape level than to the single farm level (Gabriel et al., 2010; 
Herzon and Helenius, 2008; Merckx et al., 2009; Opdam et al., 2001). Single farms or plots 
are often simply too small to secure effective delivery of such services (McKenzie et al., 
2013). For example, individual elements within landscapes, such as buffer sites, habitat 
stepping stones and ecological corridors are better able to contribute to strengthening the 
resilience of ecological networks when their location is related to existing environmental 
features (Franks and Emery, 2013; Geertsema et al., 2002; Opdam et al., 2006; Opdam et al., 
2003; Schouten et al., 2013). Recent studies show that strengthening this type of intricate 
green-blue infrastructure improves landscape permeability, which favours species mobility: 
this thus facilitates a critical adaptation strategy to offset the impacts of climate change 
(Fahrig, 2003; Franks and Emery, 2013; Van Teeffelen et al., 2015). 
However, the enhancement of ecosystem services at the landscape level requires the 
combined efforts of several land holders in ways which strengthen and complement each 
other. This requires careful planning of what to do and when and where to do it, and an 
understanding of the quality, intensity and density of on-farm measures required to achieve 
the desired level of ecosystem service delivery (Dutton et al., 2008). This spatial coordination 
can be achieved by a number of mechanisms (see for instance Boulton et al., 2013). It can be 
done by means of a landscape design by a governmental or an external agency, which 
allocates management options to specific sites, for which the individual farmers are personally 
invited to participate (Boulton et al., 2013; Dutton et al., 2008). Guidance, advice and 
facilitation can be provided by government agencies, independent consultants, professionals 
employed by a farmer group or conservation NGOs (Prager, 2015b). In addition, the actual 
design of AES can create landscape scale impacts by default, reducing or eliminating the need 
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for either farmer-farmer collaboration or third party coordination. For example, increasing the 
inter-connectedness of habitats across the landscape can be steered by limiting the number of 
management options available for specific landscapes. Because a critical mass of participants 
is required to ensure sufficient coverage in targeted landscapes, schemes could be designed so 
that payments are only awarded above a pre-determined participation rate (Appleton, 2002). 
In addition, a scheme could include specific incentive mechanisms with or without 
agglomeration bonuses depending on the suitable spatial distribution of farmers’ efforts 
(Bamière et al., 2013; Kuhfuss et al., 2016). An alternative to spatial coordination being 
imposed ‘from above’ or organised ‘from outside’ is for the spatial coordination to be 
organised by the farmers themselves (Mills et al., 2011; Westerink et al., 2015). With a view 
to enhancing landscape approaches and collaboration, the recent change in the CAP 
regulations now allows groups of farmers to be the end-beneficiaries of agri-environmental 
payments (see consideration 29 opening the Regulation (EU) 1305/2013).  
 
Collaborative governance 
The search to raise the effectiveness of ecosystem service delivery is an important explanation 
for the scholarly interest in collaboration. For the purpose of this article we distinguish 
collaborative management and collaborative governance. Collaborative management refers to 
the collaboration among land managers who are involved in actually carrying out 
management activities on-the-ground, while collaborative governance refers to the 
involvement of governmental and non-governmental actors in the processes and structures of 
decision making and management at the scheme level.  
Previous studies have focussed on collaborative management among land managers in 
agri-environmental management (Boulton et al., 2013; Jongeneel and Polman, 2014; OECD, 
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2013; Prager, 2015b). Collaboration offers farmers advantages over and above the increased 
effectiveness of their agri-environmental efforts. Rural communities often consider their 
landscape as part of their rural identity, and collaboration in local groups is a means to 
organise collective action to preserve this identity (see for example Mills et al., 2011; 
Primdahl and Kristensen, 2011). Working with one-other can build social capital and allow 
sharing of ideas, which in turn can generate new knowledge. We consider social capital as the 
soft qualities of networks and relationships that enable groups to achieve things together, 
including trust, access to knowledge and support, shared values and the capacity to learn and 
innovate as a group (Bodin and Crona, 2008; Mathijs, 2003; OECD, 2013; Pretty, 2003; Wolz 
et al., 2010). In addition, working in farmer groups may reduce each farmer’s transaction 
costs. For instance, a farmer group may supply assistance to farmers in application procedures 
and farmer-to-farmer advice in the field, or a group can share advisory services and access 
help to develop and submit scheme applications (Falconer, 2000; Franks, 2010; Polman and 
Slangen, 2008; Polman et al., 2011). Additionally, by joining forces and through their 
contacts with advisors and government officials, farmer groups are better placed to influence 
policies (Polman, 2002) and to contribute to the design of AES and measures. For example, 
farmer groups have helped tailor schemes to better integrate local landscape issues into their 
farming systems (Beckmann et al., 2009; Prager and Freese, 2009; Prager and Nagel, 2008). 
The latter studies of farmer involvement in agri-environmental policy making are 
examples of collaborative governance. Collaborative opportunities between farmers and 
citizens, wildlife organisations, research institutes and governmental agencies at various 
levels of government create larger networks (Prager, 2015b). In the collaborative governance 
arrangements of AES, these actors can be responsible for various tasks involved in the 
governance of the schemes, in varying network constellations (Westerink et al., 2017). We 
operationalise collaborative governance arrangements as the ways in which governance tasks 
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related to the AES are distributed among collaborating actors. Figure 1 lists the twelve tasks 
we identified based on Eggers et al. (2007), Mettepenningen et al. (2011) and Weber (2015). 
It is such division of labour, which is related to the different qualities and resources that are 
available to the various collaborating partners, that makes collaboration attractive and can 
make it effective. Exactly how these tasks are divided in practice is an issue that has to be 
resolved by each collaborative network in turn (Schut et al., 2013). 
 
  
Figure 1: Twelve tasks involved in the governance of agri-environment schemes. Evaluation 
may lead to adaptation of the scheme, entering a new cycle. 
 
Adaptive governance 
Collaborative governance processes need cycles of adaptation to deal with changing 
environments and to incorporate learning (Emerson et al., 2012; Mc Dougall and Ram 
Banjade, 2015; Schusler et al., 2003). As landscapes can be considered as complex social-
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ecological systems that are prone to change and uncertainty,  adaptive governance 
arrangements are required which are able to learn from the impacts of environmental 
management and adapt the strategies on the basis of lessons learnt (Armitage et al., 2009; 
Emerson et al., 2012; Folke et al., 2005; Westerink et al., 2017). Such an adaptive, learning 
approach is relevant in the light of evolution of AES, in which new schemes incorporate 
lessons from the experience with the previous ones. Unfortunately, often adaptation of 
schemes is pragmatic and political and innovation is constrained by administrative 
considerations (Chartier et al., 2016; Prager and Freese, 2009). 
In line with the above, we distinguish adaptive governance at the level of AES and 
adaptive management at the level of farmer-to-farmer collaboration and implementation of 
agri-environmental management in the field. Adaptive management by farmers involves 
learning from the results of management actions to adapt their management activities 
accordingly (Olsson et al., 2004). Farmer-farmer collaboration in agri-environmental 
management facilitates social learning based on feedback from the results of management 
activities, and from farmer-farmer discussions in ways that are not possible for coordination 
of schemes by external parties. The development of AES shows that learning from results is 
essential: therefore more collaboration between farmers would be expected to deliver more 
effective AES (Burton and Schwarz, 2013).  
 
3. Method 
We used an explorative case study approach to reveal the variety of ways landscape scale 
environmental management can be implemented. A case study approach is ideally suited 
when complex issues need to be explored from a holistic perspective and in situations where 
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the context in which decisions are made is important (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). The 
selection criteria used to identify the case studies were; 
 examples of landscape approaches with spatial coordination, 
 involvement of public funding,  
 representing a diversity of landscapes and environmental issues, 
 with detailed information available, particularly about how the schemes have changed 
over time, 
 having at least two distinctive periods with respect to the degree and intensity of 
collaboration. 
After scoping a larger number of potential cases involving spatial coordination of agri-
environmental management and collaboration, and taking into account time and budget 
constraints, we selected a subset of five cases. Four cases show an increase in involvement of 
farmer groups and the fifth case was selected as a deviant case to explore an opposite 
movement (see Seawright and Gerring, 2008). All five cases are located in the northwest of 
the EU, but in different EU member states, thus reflecting different institutional settings. In 
addition, the cases differ with respect to: year of change, number and type of participants, 
farming type and scheme objective. They also vary from regional applications of a national 
scheme to locally or regionally developed schemes, with and without co-financing from CAP. 
A brief overview of the case studies and some of their characteristics is provided in Table 1. 
We based the analysis on existing material that each contributing author had collected 
from his or her own country’s case study in previous research into collaborative approaches 
and landscape scale agri-environmental management. The available data (interview 
transcripts, official and group internal documents) were complemented with in total two 
phone interviews to fill specific knowledge gaps. In addition to the case descriptions in the 
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following section, we present in tables (available in the annex) how the twelve governance 
tasks introduced in Figure 1are distributed between governmental actors, farmer groups, and 
third parties. For each case study we counted the number of tasks performed for each category 
of actor in two phases of the development of the case to demonstrate the work load connected 
to collaboration. Tasks involving two types of actor were counted twice, tasks involving all 
three categories of actors were counted three times. In addition to this quantitative analysis, 
we undertook a qualitative comparative analysis of the ways in which spatial coordination is 
organised and of how the tasks are distributed among actors. The detailed results for each case 
are displayed in Annex 1-5, with summaries presented in the results (Table 1) and discussion 
section (Table 2). 
 
4. Results from case studies 
This section describes each of the five case studies: Arguenon Water Basin (AWB) in France; 
Agrobeheercentrum (Eco2) in Flanders, Belgium; the Higher Level Stewardship, 
environmental management option HR8 in England, United Kingdom; Stiftung Rheinische 
Kulturlandschaft (SRK) in Germany; and Water, Land and Dijken (WLD) in the Netherlands 
(see annex for more detailed information on each of these cases).  
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Table 1 Case studies and their selected descriptive characteristics 
Case study Arguenon Water 
Basin (AWB) 
Agrobeheercentrum 
(Eco2) with 
Agrobeheergroepen 
(ABGs) e.g. in the 
Dommel Valley  
Environmental 
Stewardship Scheme 
(ESS): Higher Level 
Stewardship, option 
HR8 
Stiftung Rheinische 
Kulturlandschaft (SRK) 
Water, Land and 
Dijken (WLD) 
Country France Belgium England Germany Netherlands 
Starting 
year  
1997 2008 1994 (precursor WES) 2003 1996 
Year of 
major 
change 
2008 2008 2005 (until 2015) 2003 2016 
Region Bretagne NUTS2 
Region, Côtes-
d’Armor NUTS3 
Region, Arguenon 
Water basin  
 
Valley of the river 
Dommel, consisting of 
4 municipalities: Peer, 
Neerpelt, Bochelt, 
Hamont-Achel  
HR8 can only be used 
in ESS, HLS 
agreements. HLS 
agreements can apply to 
any area of England, 
but relatively few occur 
outside specific high 
nature value target 
areas. 
Rheinland (part of the 
Bundesland Nordrhein-
Westfalen) 
Part of province of 
Noord-Holland, 
located north of 
Amsterdam between 
the coast of the North 
Sea and the dykes of 
the IJsselmeer  
Area Immediate 
protection perimeter 
is 226 ha, the 
protection of close 
perimeter is 2.300 
ha, 506 ha engaged 
in agri-
environmental 
management (2015)  
In total, about 110 ha 
was managed in 2015 
In 2014, 102,000 ha of 
land were covered by 
option HR8. 
In total, about 520 ha 
were managed in the 
year 2016 in the area of 
districts Köln and 
Düsseldorf 
Working area is about 
50,000 ha, 
predominantly 
farmland (pasture), of 
which app. 5,480 ha is 
under AES (2016). 
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Case study Arguenon Water 
Basin (AWB) 
Agrobeheercentrum 
(Eco2) with 
Agrobeheergroepen 
(ABGs) e.g. in the 
Dommel Valley  
Environmental 
Stewardship Scheme 
(ESS): Higher Level 
Stewardship, option 
HR8 
Stiftung Rheinische 
Kulturlandschaft (SRK) 
Water, Land and 
Dijken (WLD) 
Participation 
of farmers 
and non-
farmers 
810 farms in the 
water basin; 45.000 
ha of agricultural 
land; (2015); 
population served: 
170.000 inhabitants 
 
The Dommel Valley 
consist of four ABGs 
(groups of farmers 
doing agri-
environmental 
management): ABG 
Peer (Siberië): 8 
farmers; ABG Bocholt: 
11 farmers; ABG 
Hamont-Achel: 6 
farmers; ABG Neerpelt: 
4 farmers 
 
In 2014 there were 701 
agreements 
Rheinischer 
Landwirtschaftsverband 
in cooperation with 
Landwirtschaftskammer 
Nordrhein-Westfalen. It 
is a private trust/ 
charity. Farmers are 
contacted once funding 
for a project is granted 
500 dairy farmers, 100 
civic members and 
600 volunteers 
helping in on-farm 
nature management 
Main 
objective of 
initiative / 
scheme 
Improve water 
quality: (1) lower the 
nitrate content 
<50mg / l; (2) 
cleaning of 10 to 11 
million m3 water / 
year 
 
Providing landscape 
maintenance services 
and management of 
interconnected buffer 
strips alongside brooks 
and rivers by farmer 
groups 
HR8 was targeted at 
“common land and 
areas of shared grazing 
that have two or more 
active graziers” 
Promoting nature 
conservation and 
cultural landscape. 
AES provision, 
meadow birds 
protection (including 
Blacktailed godwit, 
Lapwing, Common 
redshank and 
Shoveler) 
Farming 
systems 
Intensive farming 
(Polyculture, pig, 
cattle, poultry) 
 
Diverse Beef and sheep farming 
predominates in upland 
commons agreements. 
Mainly intensive arable 
farming (e.g. cereals, 
oil seed rape) 
100% dairy farming 
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Arguenon Water Basin (France) 
The deterioration of the water quality in the Arguenon Water Basin (AWB; Bretagne, North-
West France) in the years leading up to 1997 resulted in the creation of the Arguenon 
Penthièvre Association, a municipality association which took specific responsibility for 
overseeing the quality of drinking water. Over the period described in this case study, 
governance changed from the voluntarily participation of farmers to the imposition of 
mandatory agri-environmental practices combined with reallocation of land between affected 
farmers through voluntary land purchase. 
Between 1997 and 2002, a regional programme was negotiated (Bretagne Eau Pure 2) 
between the French government and the NUTS2 Regional council to govern water quality. 
This programme mainly relied on persuasion to mobilize farmer and non-farmer actors, for 
example to use pesticides more efficiently. However, in 2001 the European Court of Justice 
ruled that France was in breach of the Surface Water Directive on the protection of water used 
for the production of drinking water for a number of water catchments in Brittany, including 
Arguenon (Case C-266/99 from 8 March 2001). So in the years between 2003 and 2006 the 
main objective became to consolidate and spread water quality-friendly practices. However, 
many municipalities failed to operationalise these voluntary water catchment protection 
measures. The uptake of national and regional AES was very low, and participants were often 
located far from key areas within the catchments. In 2007, the European Commission 
confirmed that the case would be brought before the Court for a second time and asked the 
judge to impose a lump sum payment and a daily fine.  
2007 was a transitional year in defining a comprehensive treatment of agricultural 
issues. Until then interventions had focused on the protection of the upper reaches of the 
water basin to Pleven, the drinking water catchment extraction point. After 2008, the 
Territorial Contract Watershed Arguenon "Source to Sea" programme was introduced to 
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provide for the restoration of water quality and the aquatic environment throughout the entire 
drainage basin (2008-2010). The scheme imposed a legally binding reduction in nitrate use of 
30%. In the following 5 years (2008 to 2012) the compensation payments (Compensatory 
Allowance for Environmental Constraints, ICCE), which varied with farming systems, 
decreased each year. The scheme also identified a water quality protection perimeter, and 
divided land within this area into sensitive core areas and larger supplementary areas. 
Additional mandatory constraints were imposed on land use in core areas, for example, fields 
had to be forested or maintained in permanent grassland, and either mowed or grazed without 
disturbing the soil. In addition, agricultural land outside the protection perimeter was 
purchased by the Regional Council and sold to farmers who farmed within the perimeter but 
whose economic viability was jeopardized by these compulsory restrictions. 
Under the Bretagne Eau Pure 2 Program (1997-2002), farmers formed groups which 
worked voluntarily with the public administration to decide on the design and implementation 
of AES. As the NUTS2 Regional branch of the Ministry of Agriculture supervised both the 
Bretagne Eau Pure 2 Program and the implementation of CAP AES, it was able to connect 
these two programs and integrated into their development the views of the farmer groups. 
However, this approach failed, partly because the scheme did not include the necessary far-
reaching modifications of farming practices and partly because of the voluntarily nature of the 
program: participation in key locations across the water basin was too low. In addition, the 
targeted area was too small to sufficiently impact the water quality in the basin. Nevertheless, 
the scheme raised awareness among farmers of the problem of water quality. This increased 
awareness helped to develop subsequent actions with municipality consortiums. After 2012, 
these consortiums are no longer the main policy makers. Instead, the newly designed actions 
are implemented through the state and regional governments under the leadership of national 
authorities, acting to improve the collective welfare by improving water quality to European 
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health standards, thus avoiding sanctions from the EU Commission, and to coordinate the 
exchange of land between farmers. AES work in combination with these financial incentives 
to help implement these mandatory restrictions. In July 2015, the Arguenon water basin was 
officially removed from the list of French water basins that breach the Water Directive by the 
Environment Direction of the European Commission, after 3 years of good water quality. 
The current French policy of 2014, implementing the CAP of 2013, introduces a new tool to 
enhance collective action of farmers and to promote “agroecological practices and systems”. 
Since then, the number of such “Environmental and Economic Interest Groups” (GIEE) has 
grown fast from 135 groups in 2015 to 250 in mid 2016. 
 
Agrobeheercentrum Eco2 (Belgium) 
Although in Belgium group implementation of AES was not foreseen in legislation until the 
2013 CAP reform (implemented in 2015), in the previous 15 years several farmer groups were 
already experimenting with collective agri-environmental management. For example, the poor 
maintenance of landscape elements encouraged a regional landscape organisation in West-
Flanders to recruit a group of farmers, legally organized as a non-profit organisation, to 
address this problem. Those paying for these services, farmers and non-farmers in the region, 
also had to become members of the non-profit organisation (in order to be able to pay their 
contractors) as Belgian legislation did not allow farmers to offer landscape maintenance 
contracting for payments. In order to facilitate this, the farmer’s organisation Boerenbond 
later on founded a special purpose cooperative company (with limited liability, Agro 
Aanneming). This legally allowed associated farmers to offer and be contracted for these 
types of activities. Over the years the West-Flemish cooperative has expanded its activities 
and now offers, for example, on-farm composting, chopping wood, and fence building. Whilst 
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this group represents collaboration without explicit spatial coordination, other similar farmer 
groups did include spatial coordination. For example, in the Dommel valley the public 
organisation for water management “Watering” stimulated farmers to collaborate in the 
management of interconnected buffer strips alongside brooks and rivers in a landscape based 
approach.  
In 2008, responding to the growing number of initiatives in rural Flanders, a number 
of organisations set up the project ECO² (ECOlogy x ECOnomy), using finance provided 
from the European Regional Development Fund. A principal aim of the project was to initiate 
and guide agro-management groups (Agrobeheergroepen, ABGs). The ECO² project was a 
deliberate attempt to facilitate agri-environmental collaboration between farmers in order to 
stimulate a landscape approach, but also to explore how to make environmental management 
more economically attractive for farmers. The ECO² project also established the non-profit 
organisation Agrobeheercentrum Eco² (Agro management centre Eco², from now on called 
Eco²) as an umbrella organisation of all ABGs, and as a knowledge centre for agri-
environmental management. Eco2 helps setting up ABGs and stimulates collaboration 
between farmers and other (local) actors. Eco² prefers ABGs to be small, more or less 
informal groups (containing between 4 and 11 farmers, but larger is also possible), so that the 
farmers are better connected and a group feeling is created. The groups do not have any 
official legal form, but they adopt statutes and bylaws, and elect a management board every 
five years. Payments for the agri-environmental management activities are given through the 
earlier established vehicle of Agro Aanneming. Eco² plays a role in redistributing the payment 
between farmers in the ABG, in the case of farmers performing agri-environmental 
management on the land of other farmers in the ABG, and officially contracts with other 
parties in need of landscape management. The management is then outsourced to the farmers 
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in the ABG through Agro Aanneming. For this coordinating role, Eco² receives part of the 
payment.  
Currently, there are 27 ABGs across Flanders that work towards objectives such as 
conservation of birds, erosion, water management, or landscape management. The farmers in 
the ABGs usually take up environmental management options from AES that were designed 
by the government, and there is no flexibility to adapt them to the local circumstances. Eco², 
also working with its partner VLM (Flemish Land Agency, a government body), strives to 
spatially coordinate agri-environmental management, but in an informal way as this is not 
officially registered in management plans. Although the current Flemish rural development 
plan in principle allows agri-environmental payments to groups of farmers, at the time of 
writing of this article this was not yet administratively settled, and all contract payments are 
paid to individual farmers. So farmer members of an ABG who do not wish to carry out the 
environmental management themselves, enter into contracts which transfer this work and part 
of their payment (the management-related part, retaining the compensation for loss of income) 
to the contracted farmers. Eco² acts as an intermediate, receiving and redistributing these 
compensation payments. 
 
HR8 “Supplement for Group Applications” (UK) 
The English case study describes the agri-environment overlaying option, HR8 “Supplement 
for Group Applications” as it is used on upland open commons in Higher Level Environment 
Stewardship Scheme (ESS) agreements (2005-2015). 57% of upland common land is 
designated as high-environmental value Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI) (NAO, 
2008), and as the UK government has a Public Service Agreement to improve the 
environmental status of these areas, Natural England (NE), the government’s Environmental 
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Agency, has prioritised enrolling common land into agri-environment agreements. However, 
for this to happen, NE requires that all stakeholders on the common land agree to participate 
in an AES (Short, 2000).  This is a particular problem for common land and where of the 
existence of rights beyond those associated with the conventional free-holder system, and 
where registers of all, or of even only the active rights-holders, are often incomplete or 
inaccurate (Short and Winter, 1999).   
This difficulty in recruiting groups of farmers was addressed by the forerunner of 
HR8, the Wildlife Enhancement Scheme (WES). WES (1994 to 2008) was designed as a 
flexible, tailor made, site-specific scheme. It could be used in stand-alone agreements, or to 
“top-up” payments to either Environmental Sensitive Area (ESA) or Countryside Stewardship 
Scheme (CSS) agreements. NE required CSS/ESA+WES agreements covering common land 
to be negotiated by a single representative, nominated by all who held a legal interest in the 
land (for example, active and non-active graziers, non-farmer rights-holders, and owners of 
the commons). Therefore, NE paid an individual farmer, but that payment was shared by the 
group (Short, 2000). 
In 2005 the Environmental Stewardship Scheme’s (ESS) Higher Level Stewardship 
(HLS) was introduced, and this allowed farmers to select the HR8 option “Supplement for 
Group Applications”. HR8 was an overlaying option which had to be combined with other 
environmental management options available under HLS (HLS+HR8). It was targeted to be 
used on “common land and areas of shared grazing” and could only be included in agreements 
that covered land “under more than one ownership that are to be managed for resource 
protection, inter-tidal flood management, and/or wetland management”  (DEFRA, 2005, p. 
108). It paid £10/ha of land included by the HR8 option, as compensation for the farmer 
group’s transaction costs, for example, costs incurred arranging farmer-farmer meetings, and 
organising, submitting and managing their joint application. 
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To include HR8 in a farm’s HLS agreement, farmers with eligible farm-spanning 
environment features needed to agree to jointly manage the feature(s) and had to jointly select 
appropriate environmental management options that would apply across the feature(s). In 
addition to including option HR8, agreements over commons grazed by more than one farmer 
needed all stakeholders to agree with the selection of additional environmental management 
options. Natural England required each farmer group to open a bank account into which the 
entire HLS+HR8 payment would be paid, and to submit an internal agreement, signed by all 
relevant stakeholders. The terms of the internal agreement were allowed to vary to 
accommodate the wide range of farming arrangements found on open commons, but each 
agreement had to include full detail of the location of the management options, each parties’ 
contributions to the scheme, and details on how the payment would be shared out between the 
group members. This allows for variation between internal agreements as to who is involved, 
who should receive a share of the payment, and the payments they are due (Short and 
Waldon, 2013, p. 8). A side-benefit of offering option HR8 is the revitalisation, and in some 
cases re-creation, of Commoners Associations – informal groups of farmers who farm the 
same area of common land (Short, 2000). The Commoner Associations often drew on the help 
of third parties, such as National Park Authorities and/or conservation NGOs, in their initial 
stages. 
Importantly, the way the HLS is designed allows it to make an additional contribution 
to landscape scale environmental management. HLS agreements with individual farmers are 
predominately available in geographically small, high nature value areas, each of which 
focuses on its particular priority habitats and species. As a result farmers within the same HLS 
area must select from the same, very limited list of environmental management options. 
Additionally, all HLS agreements have to be signed off by an NE project officer. This project 
officer knows the environmental features across the entire landscape and can request changes 
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to the submitted plan so they better take into account landscape features on neighbouring 
farms. These design features allow HLS to deliver a degree of landscape scale management in 
the absence of farmer-farmer collaboration or third party coordination, provided sufficient 
farmers within the same HLS area enrol in the scheme. 
 
Stiftung Rheinische Kulturlandschaft (Germany) 
In Germany, land use planning, nature conservation and landscape management are devolved 
to the federal states (Bundesländer). This has resulted in different policies and practices being 
adopted throughout the country. The dominant strategy for agri-environmental services 
consists of individual AES contracts with farmers, complemented with individual 
conservation agreements (VNS, not EU co-financed) in those states that have reserved budget 
for them. Landcare associations (LCAs, see Prager, 2015a) play an important role in many 
Länder, for instance in the implementation of Natura 2000 management, the monitoring and 
reporting of results, as well as the management of publicly owned marginal land that has no 
economic value to farmers. LCAs contract groups of farmers to manage this land according to 
conservation goals as part of projects. Membership is voluntary and groups may represent an 
extended network, which can include individuals representing farming, conservation, 
community, education, tourism, hunting, fishing or other interests (Prager, 2015a). In 
addition, local initiatives that are organized as trusts play an increasing role in e.g. 
Niedersachsen, Rheinland-Pfalz, Bayern, Sachsen-Anhalt and Nordrhein-Westfalen. They 
follow a cooperative approach in their work with land managers and also contract farmers. 
The Stiftung Rheinische Kulturlandschaft (SRK) organisation is described in more 
detail. SRK is a private trust which has operated in the region of Köln and Düsseldorf (state of 
Nordrhein-Westfalen) since 2003. It differs from an LCA in that it can also buy land as a legal 
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entity. The region is characterised by fertile soils and intensive arable farming, growing 
commodity crops such as cereals and oil seed rape. We consider the private trust to be mainly 
a ‘farmer group’ because it was jointly founded by the regional farmers’ association and the 
Agricultural Chamber of the state. The farmers were concerned about the loss of agricultural 
land to urban development, and the related nature compensation measures. The establishment 
of SRK was triggered by a large federal conservation project aimed at identifying 
collaborative solutions to land use conflicts. As a trust, SRK does not have members, and its 
day-to-day work is carried out by a professional staff. However, its executive committee 
consists of representatives of the farmers’ union, the Agricultural Chamber of the state and 
nature conservation organisations.  
The aim of the SRK is “the promotion of nature and landscape protection, through 
maintaining and managing the uniqueness, biodiversity and beauty of the Rhineland farming 
landscape.” The trust promotes conservation measures (species and habitat protection) and 
facilitates compensation measures on farmland. It performs spatial co-ordination by 
identifying suitable sites and environmental measures, and aims to secure these management 
activities permanently. It also works through keeping conservation areas in trust. The 
approach is characterised by voluntary participation of farmers, appropriate payments for 
clearly defined services, as well as consideration of the farming enterprise and agricultural 
structure. The trust works towards integrating economic and environmental interests of 
agricultural land management, and ensures that the practice of farming is considered when 
nature protection measures are designed and implemented. SRK coordinates individual 
farmers’ efforts; typically there is no farmer-farmer collaboration. In individual projects, third 
parties may be involved.  
SRK does not make use of the state’s AES, but is funded on project basis by the 
federal level and by companies with interests in nature conservation. Additional money is 
23 
 
donated by other trusts. SRK carries out pilot projects ‘to demonstrate collaborative 
solutions’, e.g. with a focus on protecting sparrows, pollinators, swallows, and plant species in 
arable fields, and producing seed mixtures of wild plants. SRK submits funding applications, 
and after a project is awarded identifies farmers who are willing to participate (where 
required). Ultimately, therefore, the effectiveness of their spatial coordination activities builds 
on the voluntary participation of individual farmers which is ex ante uncertain. These projects 
tend to be input or effort based. For larger projects, monitoring of results is planned and 
budgeted for as part of the application. 
 
Water, Land en Dijken (Netherlands) 
Individual and collaborative agri-environmental management has a long history in Dutch peat 
grassland areas. In the late nineteen seventies, a group of young farmers in one such area had 
already started to develop integrated agriculture and wildlife management at the landscape 
scale. Over the last 30 years, farmer groups have become institutionalised within Dutch agri-
environmental governance, and are now an integral part of the Dutch Rural Development 
Plan. For example, the environmental association Water, Land & Dijken (WLD) is today an 
important actor in landscape management north of Amsterdam, applying local skills and 
involving relevant networks. In 2016, a tailor-made landscape management arrangement 
between WLD and the province of North-Holland started as part of the new Dutch AES (RDP 
2016-2021).  
In 1996, the environmental cooperative “Waterland” was officially founded (see the 
Water, Land & Dijken case study in OECD, 2013). It delivered administrative services to an 
increasing number of farmers to support agri-environmental contracting. The size of the 
organisation increased with regard to membership and working area due to mergers with 
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neighbouring environmental cooperatives, after which it changed its name to WLD, and 
became a more formalised organisation. But as a result of the expansion, the social distance 
between the association and individual farmers has increased. 
From 2012 to 2014 the Dutch government experimented with new types of 
collaborative agri-environmental management, choosing WLD as one of its four pilot study 
areas. An important aim of the pilot studies was the development and trial of new collective 
schemes, in preparation for rolling them out across the country (Terwan and Rozendaal, 
2014). The pilot allowed WLD to experiment with taking responsibility for additional 
governance tasks, one of which was spatial coordination. The WLD pilot found that the 
administrative procedures required to deal with the variety of situations encountered, and the 
need to develop tailor-made regional plans, proved to be time consuming (involving “a lot of 
paperwork”). However, farmers accepted WLD role being responsible for control and 
sanctioning. The determining factors for farmers accepting WLD to perform this role were 
transparency, comprehensive communication (through for example, newsletters and frequent 
meetings), social cohesion, protocols for monitoring, use of graduated sanctions, as well as 
trust farmers have in WLD’s field coordinators. The farmers appreciate WLD’s approach to 
requiring improvements from participants (as in contrast to control by governmental 
agencies): their first step was to explain to the farmer what he had done wrong, the second 
step was to explain that other consequences may follow, depending on the seriousness and 
context of the offence. Although the pilot was jointly evaluated from the angle of governance, 
WLD regretted afterwards that no ecological evaluation was done.  
The current Dutch Rural Development Plan recognised WLD as a formal farmer 
group. Therefore, from 2016 onward, WLD is responsible for compiling a collective 
management plan for their area to apply for subsidy from the AES, recruiting and contracting 
farmers, and the control of delivery of agreed management options. WLD is also responsible 
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for paying individual farmers in designated core areas and for the spatial coordination of 
farmers’ individual agri-environmental management. Central to the new approach is that 
farmer group applications will only be granted in areas where cross-holding management is 
expected to enhance biodiversity. The suitability of such areas is assessed with respect to their 
physical landscape conditions and the existing populations of species. As a consequence, 
farmers can only receive agri-environmental payments if they are a member of a formal 
farmer group, and participation in AES is restricted to farmers who farm in pre-designated 
areas. 
Another objective of this collective farmer approach is to reduce public as well as 
individual farmer’s administrative costs associated with the AES by handing over some 
administrative responsibilities to the farmer groups. Typical measures in peat areas such as 
WLD’s focus on preserving meadow bird species, including Blacktailed godwit, Lapwing, 
Common redshank and Shoveler. Good ecological conditions for these birds are wet 
grasslands, a diverse food source (related to grassland biodiversity), and a postponed mowing 
date. The new scheme allows the farmer group some flexibility in matching sites and 
measures to actual locations of nesting birds during the season. 
 
5. Discussion  
The governance arrangements outlined in the case studies vary widely with regard to the 
actors involved, their role in the process of scheme design and implementation, and the 
governance tasks they carry out. Despite this, each case study represents an example of 
collaborative governance which includes an element of spatial coordination of management 
activities, thus representing a landscape scale approach to AES. In particular, the case studies 
show how the task of spatial coordination is addressed in different contexts and at different 
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geographical levels, ranging from national schemes to local initiatives. By comparing the two 
successive phases of each scheme (see the annex), we also illustrate the dynamic nature of 
governance arrangements. In the following, we discuss our findings according to the 
conceptual framework: spatial coordination, collaborative governance arrangements, and 
adaptation.  
 
Spatial coordination 
Each case study represents a landscape scale approach to AES. This allows the 
implementation of measures across farm holdings and thus a better management of 
watersheds (AWB), meadow birds (WLD), upland commons (HR8), landscape elements 
(Eco²) and agricultural landscape biodiversity (SRK). The spatial coordination is achieved in 
the multiple ways: 1) designation of areas within which farmers can apply; 2) identification of 
suitable sites and measures and inviting farmers at those locations to participate; 3) 
development of joint management plans with or by groups of farmers; 4) limiting the number 
of available management options to such an extent, that neighbouring farmers are likely to 
select similar measures; 5) adjustment of spatial planning of measures to the seasonal 
behaviour of the target species; and 6) imposing compulsory environmental management on 
farmers in specific locations (Table 2). 
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Table 2: Mechanisms for spatial coordination of environmental management across farm 
holdings in case studies and other organisational features 
 Case studies, country, and targeted environmental features  
AWB 
(watershed 
management), 
France 
Eco2 
(landscape 
elements), 
Belgium 
HR8  
(upland 
commons),  
England 
SRK  
(agr. landscape 
biodiversity), 
Germany 
WLD  
(meadow bird 
protection),  
Netherlands 
Mechanisms for 
spatial coordination 
 
1) Designated areas 
for applications 
√  √  √ 
2) Inviting farmers to 
predefined sites and 
measures 
√ √  √ √ 
3) Joint management 
plans  
  √  √ 
4) Limiting available 
management 
options  
  √   
5) Adjusting spatial 
planning of 
measures to target 
species. 
    √ 
6) Compulsory 
environmental 
management  
√     
Type of organisation 
performing spatial 
coordination 
 
Government agency √     
Farmer-based boundary 
organisation 
 √ √ √ √ 
Collaborative 
management  
 
Individual execution of 
environmental 
management 
√  √ √ √ 
Farmer-to-farmer 
collaboration in 
environmental 
management 
 √ √  (√) 
Contracting  
Individual contracts √ √  √ (√*) 
Collective/ joint 
contracts 
  √  √ 
* Individual farmer has a contract with the farmer group, the farmer group has a contract with the 
government 
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The case studies show that spatial coordination is often undertaken by professional 
organisations. This can be initiated by a governmental agency, such as Natural England, by a 
farmer group, or by a multi-stakeholder organisation. Our case studies suggest that spatial 
coordination of agri-environmental measures is such a complex task that it requires to be 
handled by professionals employed by a dedicated organisation. What we initially framed as 
‘farmer group’ sometimes takes the shape of a professional farmers’ organisation, or more 
precise, a farmer-based boundary organisation (Carr and Wilkinson, 2005; Franks, 2010). 
Eco2, SRK and WLD are (co-)founded by farmers or farmers’ organisations and all operate 
on the boundary between the worlds of farmers and of other actors, including governments. 
Performing a number of governance tasks and mediating between farmers and governmental 
and non-governmental actors they have hybrid identities, SRK even being a multi-stakeholder 
organisation. Nevertheless, these farmer-based boundary organisations do not necessarily 
stimulate farmer-to-farmer collaborative management in the field: they may simply coordinate 
individual actions (Table 2).  
This raises a question around the relationship between professionalism, size, and 
social capital within groups of farmers (OECD, 2013). A farmer group needs to have grown 
sufficiently large to allow it to develop the organisational capacity and institutional capital 
needed to professionalise. From studies the historical development of agricultural 
cooperatives we know that the need for professional management introduces a new class of 
officials whose interests, focus and concerns may run the risk to become different from those 
of the original participants (Bijman et al., 2014; Kaswan, 2014). This may create a 
disconnectedness that negatively impacts on member’s involvement and commitment. These 
larger groups, therefore, need to find ways to combine the professionalism needed for spatial 
coordination with the social capital (connectedness, ownership) needed to maintain an active 
membership group. The case studies represent a number of solutions to this problem. 
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Although upland HR8 agreements are often initiated by a government agency and Eco² is an 
initiative of a farmers’ organisation, they both build on farmer-to-farmer collaboration in 
small groups to develop and maintain social capital. Eco² represents a nested structure of 
smaller groups, and while WLD is a merger of a number of agri-environmental co-operatives, 
other Dutch farmer groups have maintained their nested structure. Ostrom (1990) believes 
these nested structures are important for well-functioning self-governance when groups grow 
large, because smaller groups are more conducive to the development of social capital. 
 
Collaborative governance arrangements 
We now turn to the other tasks in the governance of the schemes and how the way they are 
distributed among the collaborating actors has changed over time. Figure 2 summarises these 
changes (for details on individual case studies and how they changed see Annex A1-A5). It 
provides an overview over time in each case study with respect to the development of the 
involvement of governmental actors, farmer groups and third parties in managing the various 
governance tasks associated with AES. All of the voluntary schemes show an increase in 
involvement of farmer groups and third parties over time. The first voluntary and later 
mandatory Arguenon water basin case study (AWB) is the exception. In this case, government 
has reassumed some control over the scheme’s governance and stakeholder involvement in 
governance tasks decreased. 
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Figure 2: The number of governance tasks carried out by actors involved (government, farmer 
groups, third parties), and the change of the arrangement over time (reference and new 
situation compared) 
 
The responsibility of government, in the sense of which governance tasks are performed, 
appears to be relatively stable over time for all cases except for WLD and SRK. In the 
reference situation of all the case studies, goal setting, spatial coordination, design of 
schemes, contracting, control, payment and evaluation were entirely managed by government. 
As the schemes have developed to the new situation, government generally maintains 
involvement in these activities, but now allows other parties to participate. In the case studies 
of SRK and WLD the number of tasks of government diminished. In the Netherlands, a 
decision was taken at the national level to give more responsibility to farmer groups, 
including being entirely responsible for recruiting participants, managing the spatial 
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coordination of their activities, the control of these activities, arranging contracts and making 
the payments to individual farmers. SRK shows at a regional scale and on project basis how a 
farmer-based boundary organisation can perform recruiting of participants, contracting of 
individual farmers, control and payment without interference of government. 
The number of tasks performed partly or wholly by farmer groups increased over time 
in all case study areas, except for the Arguenon water basin (AWB) case, where the role of the 
farmer groups in the governance of the AES was terminated. The Belgian Eco² and the 
German SRK show a major change in the involvement of farmers, starting from a situation 
where they were not involved as a group. The number of tasks performed by farmer groups 
increased substantially within the English HR8 and the Dutch WLD case studies as well, but 
in those cases farmer groups had already been involved in a number of governance activities 
in the reference situation. The involvement of farmer groups in spatial coordination increased 
in three of the case studies, while their role in contracting participants was new in two cases. 
Involvement in making payment to farmers was introduced in the Eco², WLD and SRK case 
studies. The role of farmer groups in recruiting and contracting of participants increased over 
time suggesting an increasing role of farmer self-organisation and internal collaboration in 
fulfilment of tasks. 
As Figure 2 further shows, the role of third parties in the collaborative governance 
increased for most cases, in particular in the HR8 and WLD cases. For the AWB, involvement 
of third parties was and remained high compared to the other case studies. Also in in the 
reference situation for Eco² and WLD involvement of third parties was already strong. 
Involvement of third parties in SRK remained limited. In the case of HR8, third parties were 
mainly involved in the preparation phases of the scheme. 
The increased involvement of farmer groups and third parties in most of these case 
studies suggests that the governance associated with AES has become increasingly 
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collaborative in nature. This collaboration is arranged in various ways, including a formal 
farmer group approach in the Netherlands. Our case studies show that a higher number of 
actors have become involved in governance tasks, which is likely to lead to higher levels of 
activities per task and therefore resulting in an overall increase in transaction costs. This is in 
line with literature, stating that more collaboration normally implies an increase in transaction 
costs (Beckmann et al., 2009; Hagemann et al., 2015). According to economic theory, any 
increase in transaction costs should ideally be compensated for by additional gains (Jongeneel 
et al., 2012; Mettepenningen et al., 2009; Shelanski and Klein, 1995). Actors apparently have 
good reasons for engaging in collaboration, in spite of the costs. Whether the Dutch approach 
results in the intended overall decrease in transaction costs remains to be seen. 
The observed increase in collaboration in the case studies is accompanied by different 
institutional designs: SRK, Eco² and AWB rely on individual contracts (the still dominating 
contract form in the EU for AES), whereas WLD follows the farmer collective approach with 
collective contracts. The new Dutch model excludes the possibility of individual contracts 
between government and farmers, implying that an institutional structure is imposed on them, 
which farmers and their organisations have to align with. The HR8 case represents a hybrid 
form which combines an internal agreement between farmers with a single agreement 
between the farmer group and the government agent (see Table 2).  
 
Adaptation and learning 
In addition to examining trends in collaboration and spatial coordination, the evolution of 
scheme design can be explored for evidence of learning and adaptation. The change of the 
scheme in the French case is an example of adaptation: a lack of effectiveness led to 
abandonment of the previous scheme. It changed from ‘voluntary and collaborative’ to 
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‘mandatory and individual’ after the evaluation of results from water quality monitoring. 
However, learning about the complexity of the social-ecological system and especially the 
influence of the social part of the system on the ecological part did not take place, because 
social mechanisms that could have explained the failure of the first scheme were not 
considered, nor the positive outcomes of collaboration among farmers with respect to farmer 
awareness. In the Netherlands, effects of the previous scheme were monitored in terms of 
ecological indicators. In the new scheme, to improve effectiveness, this led to a reduction of 
areas eligible for agri-environment subsidies. The farmer group approach was a result of a 
pilot project involving four large, pre-existing (and professionally organised) agri-
environmental cooperatives. In sum, two learning strategies stood at the base of the new 
scheme, although not all innovations developed in the pilot were implemented (Terwan and 
Rozendaal, 2014). Also in England, lessons from the previous scheme were deliberately taken 
into account in the development of the new scheme; in particular by offering environmental 
management options which reflected local environmental priorities and existing cultural and 
agricultural practices. In Belgium-Flanders, the farmers’ organisation and later Eco2 also 
learned from the experiences of the early initiatives. However, the German case illustrates the 
vulnerability of monitoring and evaluation. Here, monitoring is mainly carried out when 
funded as part of the individual project. A lack of funding for monitoring and data 
management can severely hinder learning from experiences and adaptive governance of 
schemes. Another concern is that organizing learning among participants, which would be a 
prerequisite for adaptive management, is only in a few cases part of the governance of the 
scheme (see Annex A1-A5). 
 
6. Conclusions 
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This article compares the development of five Northwest European case studies of the spatial 
coordination of environmental management designed to deliver landscape scale impacts 
within AES. Although the analysis is based on only five case studies, this is sufficient to show 
the wide variation in approaches that can be used to deliver spatial coordination. The analysis 
shows how the change made to each scheme resulted in the reallocation of responsibilities for 
a range of governance tasks between collaborating actors, and we considered the extent to 
which this is a result of learning from previous experiences. We presumed that a landscape 
approach would require an increase in collaboration. In four of the five case studies, 
collaboration did increase, in the sense that more actors, and especially groups of farmers 
became involved in more governance tasks within the scheme. In the other case study, the 
involvement of a group of farmers was terminated with the change of the scheme. The 
increased involvement of farmer groups and other actors in the governance of two of the four 
schemes did not diminish the role of governmental actors: government remained involved in 
its traditional tasks. In the case of SRK in Germany, the farmer organisation performs quite a 
number of governance tasks without government involvement. In the national farmer group 
approach in the Netherlands, the government has withdrawn from a number of tasks, which 
have been allocated to the domain of ‘self-governance’.  
The increasing involvement of different actor groups in four out of five case studies 
(the AWB case being an exception) suggests that collaborative governance in AES provision 
is more than a theoretical construct and has potential in a wide range of situations. 
Collaboration in these cases increased not only between groups (e.g. government, farmers, 
NGOs), but also within groups (in particular between farmers). This development was 
coupled with an increased involvement of farmers in governance tasks, including the spatial 
coordination of activities in land management and nature conservation. Those farmer groups 
which are managing spatial coordination appear to have developed into professional farmer-
35 
 
based boundary organisations. Both the increase of collaboration and the professionalization 
of farmer groups point at the complexity of governance of landscape scale AES. In 
developing such schemes, an increase of transaction costs should be accepted, especially 
when this can be justified by improvements in scheme effectiveness. In addition, governments 
could invest in capacity building, to promote peer-to-peer exchanges and social learning 
processes between different types of actors, and in this way help to raise the   
professionalization of farmer groups. Farmer groups, in turn, need to safeguard social capital 
within the group when growing and professionalising. 
We described two stages in the evolution of the five AES case studies, but the 
reference periods were not necessarily the first period in their evolution, and the new 
arrangements are unlikely to be the last. However, the way in which experiences from the 
reference period have been incorporated in the new scheme, and the extent to which learning, 
monitoring of outcomes and evaluation are organised as part of the governance tasks in the 
scheme, give an indication of adaptive governance in AES. Although in all case studies, some 
experiences from the previous scheme were incorporated in the new scheme, there is no 
evidence that this was based on a comprehensive strategy of learning, monitoring and 
evaluation. We consider an interdisciplinary (ecological and social) and participatory strategy 
for learning, monitoring and evaluation (both within farmer groups as well as within the 
collaborating network as a whole) to be essential for adaptive agri-environmental governance 
arrangements in general and for landscape scale approaches in particular.  
The diversity of governance arrangements outline in the case studies suggest that 
spatial coordination and collaboration can be arranged in various ways. There is no need to 
look for a one-size-fits-all, or to use a copy and paste approach to scheme design. Indeed, 
spatial coordination by a governmental actor, or by a third party working with individual 
farmers may work well in many areas, and such schemes may be easier to organise than 
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complex collaborative governance arrangements (Boulton et al., 2013). In addition, 
mandatory environmental management may be necessary in some circumstances. 
Nevertheless, this article shows that farmer groups can have a substantial role in the 
governance of AES. As second-hand experiences can be helpful in adaptive learning 
processes (Barzelay, 2007; Olsson et al., 2004), we are convinced that the case studies in this 
article will inspire others striving for spatial coordination and collaboration in environmental 
management schemes. In addition, our findings can be a stimulus for EU Member States to 
further exploit the possibilities to strengthen the landscape scale approach, e.g. by utilizing the 
possibility offered in the RDP policy (Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013, article 28, sub-clause 
2) to target AES policies to groups of farmers and/or other land-managers. 
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Annex A: Tables with distribution governance tasks in the case studies of landscape 
approach agri-environment schemes (AES) 
This appendix summarizes the distribution of governance tasks among actors in the case 
studies. Actors performing part of the governance of the AES are categorized as 
governmental, group of farmers or third parties. Governmental actors include local and 
regional tiers. The other private (third) parties include (external) parties such as NGOs, 
consultants, and volunteer (groups). The cases are presented separately in five tables: (A1) 
Arguenon water basin (AWD), France; (A2) Agrobeheercentrum (Eco²), Flanders, Belgium; 
(A3) Supplement for Group Applications (HR8), England, United Kingdom; (A4) Stiftung 
Rheinische Kulturlandschaft (SRK), Germany; and (A5) Water Land & Dijken (WLD), the 
Netherlands. In every case the reference situation is in the top cell (light grey) and the 
alternative, new situation in the bottom cell. If a task is performed by an actor category it is 
ticked with “√” and if a task is not performed by an actor category it is denoted with “ ̶ “.  
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Table A1: Table with governance tasks in the French Arguenon case in the previous situation (top cells per task): before establishment of last 
policy change, compared to the current situation (bottom cells per task)* 
 Governance tasks 
Government 
(public) 
Private parties 
Farmer group Third parties 
Goal setting at 
landscape level 
√ Nuts3, Nuts5 
√ State, Côte d’Armor (regional 
council), Town 
√ Farmers local group 
√ Farmer group, (nitrate levels in 
water 
√ State authorities take the leadership 
- Local farmer representatives are 
consulted 
√ Water agency 
Design of scheme √ Government, Nuts3 
√ State, Côte d’Armor (regional 
council), Town, Water agency, local 
water association Arguenon-Penthièvre 
√ Farmer group 
√ Chamber of Agriculture (farmland 
office) 
√ State authorities take the leadership 
- Local farmer representatives are 
consulted 
- 
Design of on-farm 
measures  
√ Government, Nuts3 
√ State, Côte d’Armor (regional council) 
√ Local farmer group √ Chamber of Agriculture 
√ Water European directive water 
agency, local water association 
Arguenon –Penthièvre 
- Local farmer representatives are 
consulted 
√ Unchanged 
Spatial coordination 
- - - 
√ Leadership by State authorities, Nuts3 
Côte d'Armor region, towns and water 
agency 
√ Local farmer representatives are 
consulted in the whole watershed 
√ Chamber of Agriculture (farmland 
office) 
Recruiting participants 
- - 
√ Chamber of Agriculture (farmland 
office) 
√ State, Town - 
√ SBAFER, NUTS2 regional rural 
land office 
Contracting individual 
farmers 
√ Government, Département, water 
agency 
- 
√ Chamber of Agriculture (farmland 
office) 
√ Unchanged - 
√ Town community, expended 
watershed, SBAFER, Brittany land 
regulator 
Extension 
√ Water agency, Côte d’Armor (region) - 
√ Chamber of Agriculture (farmland 
office) 
√ Town community, expanded 
watershed 
√ Farmers in an expanded watershed - 
Organising exchange 
and learning √ EU funds paying agency (ASP) - 
√ Chamber of Agriculture (farmland 
office) 
√ Unchanged √Local farmer group 
√ Chamber of Agriculture (farmland 
office), (SBAFER, Brittany land 
regulator) 
Monitoring of results √ Government, Water agency, Côte 
d’Armor (region), EU funds paying 
agency (ASP) 
√ Farmer group ̶- 
√ Unchanged √ Unchanged - 
Control √ EU funds paying agency (ASP), Water 
agency, Côte d’Armor (region), because 
these organizations fund action 
programs, therefore they also control. 
- - 
√ New perimeter control - - 
Payment √ Agence de Service et de Paiement 
(ASP), Water agency, Côte d’Armor 
(region) 
- - 
√ Unchanged - - 
Evaluation √ Government, EU funds paying agency 
(ASP), Water Agency, Côte d’Armor 
(regional council) 
- 
√ Chamber of Agriculture (farm 
land office) 
√ Unchanged - 
√ Town community, expanded 
watershed 
* Chamber of Agriculture: Joint organization: agricultural policy in France is co-managed between the administration (central [State] and 
decentralized [representation of the central government in the regions and the departments] and agricultural professions represented by the 
majority unions. Most management agencies, animation and financing fall under this principle: from a legal point of view, they are public 
organization and private, however we classify the public organization in a private category because report to a specific operation that be 
confused with that of joint structure.  
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Document de travail Eureval C3E, décembre 2012 
Arrêté préfectoral déclarant d’utilité publique l’instauration, autour de la retenue de la Ville Hatte sur l’Arguenon, des périmètres de 
protection réglementaire et instituant des servitudes pour le compte du Département des Côtes-d'Armor. Janvier 2008.  
Conseil général des Côtes-d'Armor (2007). Enquête d’utilité publique. Révision de la protection autour de la retenue d’eau sur l’Arguenon. 
Prise d’eau de la Ville Hatte à Pléven.  
Conseil général des Côtes-d'Armor (2005); L’alimentation en eau potable dans les Côtes-d'Armor. Protection des points d’eau publics: le 
protocole d’accord.  
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Table A2: Table with governance tasks for Eco² case in the previous situation before establishment of Eco² (top cells per task), compared to 
the current situation (before 2016) with changed role of Eco² (bottom cells per task). 
 Governance tasks 
Government 
(public) 
Private parties 
Farmer group Eco² Third parties 
Goal setting at 
landscape level 
√ Flemish government (designating areas 
and conservation targets) 
̶ 
√ Influence of several strategic 
advisory councils: SALV (Strategic 
Advisory Council for Agriculture 
and Fisheries; members are the 
Flemish farmers organisations and 
other organisations active in the 
field of agriculture and fisheries); 
SERV (Flemish Socio-Economic 
Council; members are the Flemish 
employers and employee 
organisations); Minaraad (Strategic 
Advisory Council on Environment, 
Nature and Energy; members are 
environmental, landscape, socio-
economic and socio-cultural 
organisations); municipalities and 
provinces 
√ The Eco² has an influence on goal 
setting regarding AEMs and BOs through 
the representation of its members in 
advisory committees such as SALV.Eco², 
however, has most influence on goal 
setting in local agri-environmental projects 
outside of AEMs (agri-environment 
measures) and BOs (management 
agreements) 
- √ Unchanged 
Design of schemes √ For AEMs: Department of Agriculture 
and Fisheries- Division of Sustainable 
Agricultural Development; For BOs: 
Flemish Land Agency 
̶ 
√ Advice from SALV, SERV, 
Minaraad 
√ See goal setting - √ Unchanged 
Design of on-farm 
measures  
√ For AEMs: Department of Agriculture 
and Fisheries- Division of Sustainable 
Agricultural Development; For BOs: 
Flemish Land Agency 
̶ 
√ Advice from SALV, SERV, 
Minaraad 
√ See goal setting - √ Unchanged 
Spatial coordination √ AEMs are applicable to Flanders as a 
whole; Some BOs are targeted to specific 
areas; and Farm planners of the VLM 
strategically approach farmers to convince 
them to participate, to ensure a landscape 
approach and increase the environmental 
effectiveness of the AEMs and BOs 
̶ ̶ 
√ Unchanged 
√ Together with the farm planners, 
regional coordinators of the Eco² try to 
achieve spatial coordination of AEMs 
and BOs 
- 
Recruiting participants √ Managing authorities, through websites, 
folders, etc. and Farm planners of the 
VLM play an important role in convincing 
farmers to participate in agri-
environmental management and also help 
them with the application procedure 
̶ 
√ Flemish Rural Network: groups 
all organisations and government 
bodies involved in the PDPO; one 
of its tasks is providing info on the 
PDPO; and Farmers organisations 
√ Unchanged 
√ Done by the regional coordinators of 
the Eco²; and regional coordinators 
apply for agri-environmental projects 
for their ABGs, outside of the AEMs 
and BOs 
√ Unchanged 
Contracting individual 
farmers 
√ Farmers can apply for all their subsidies 
through a collective (online) application 
(‘verzamelaanvraag’). 
̶ ̶ 
√ Unchanged - 
√ For projects, this is done through 
the vehicle AgroAanneming 
Extension √ Farm planners of the VLM; Managing 
authorities of AEMs and BOs; and 
Provincial and municipal agricultural 
counters 
̶ ̶ 
√ Unchanged 
√ Regional coordinators advise their 
ABGs on agri-environmental 
management 
- 
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 Governance tasks 
Government 
(public) 
Private parties 
Farmer group Eco² Third parties 
Organising exchange 
and learning ̶ ̶ √ Farmers organisations 
- 
√ The Eco² regularly organises courses 
on agri-environmental management and 
organises exchange between ABGs (also 
internationally). 
√ Unchanged 
Monitoring of results 
√ By the managing authorities, 
coordinated by the CCEP (Coordinating 
Cell for European Rural Policy); and 
Executive Committee 
(‘Uitvoeringscomité’): members are all 
government bodies involved in the PDPO; 
they meet regularly to discuss progress. 
̶ 
√ Supervisory Committee 
(‘Toezichtscomité’): members are 
representatives from the Executive 
Committee, different levels of 
government (including EU and 
municipal levels), SALV, SERV, 
Minaraad; evaluate progress and 
realisation of objectives. 
√ Unchanged 
√ Regional coordinators closely monitor 
the activities of their ABGs, especially 
at the beginning of projects; The Eco² is 
planning to engage in a research project 
that will investigate alternative 
monitoring schemes (by volunteers, 
farmers themselves, local organisations, 
etc.) 
√ Unchanged 
Control √ Agency for Agriculture and Fisheries 
(Flemish level, payment authority) 
̶ ̶ 
√ Unchanged - - 
Payment √ Agency for Agriculture and Fisheries 
(Flemish level, payment authority) 
̶ ̶ 
√ Unchanged 
√ Still individual payments for AEMs 
and BOs, which are then redistributed 
by the Eco² among the farmers of the 
ABG, AgroAanneming is again used as 
a vehicle; Payments for project work go 
through the Eco² and AgroAanneming. 
- 
Evaluation √ Department of Agriculture and 
Fisheries, Division of Monitoring and 
Studies: they are responsible, but the 
actual evaluation is done by an external 
consortium of researchers. 
̶ ̶ 
√ Unchanged 
√ The operations of the Eco² and its 
ABGs are evaluated by its Management 
Board 
- 
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Table A3: Table with governance tasks in the previous situation (top cells per task): stand-alone Wildlife Enhancement Scheme agreements 
(WES) and Countryside Stewardship Scheme top-up payments for AES agreements covering upland commons (CSS+WES, 1994-2008) 
compared to the current situation (bottom cells per task): collaborative AES option HR8 on upland commons agreements: 2005 to 2015.  
 Governance tasks 
Government 
(public) 
Private parties 
Farmer group Third parties 
Goal setting at 
landscape level 
√ Targeted at high nature value areas, 
including common land (SSSIs) 
̶ ̶ 
√ Generally follows widespread 
consultation, and based on NE 
experience and knowledge bank. 
√ Involved in consultation 
√ Various parties involved in 
consultation 
Design of scheme √ NE designed WES to maintain and 
enhance nature conservation entered into 
the scheme, and to augment CSS 
agreements. 
̶ ̶ 
√ Consultation combined with NE 
knowledge 
√ Involved in consultation √ Involved in consultation 
Design of on-farm 
measures (i.e. 
environmental 
management options) 
√ Environmental measures vary between 
agreements, depending on targeted 
habitat type. 
√ Management plan agreed in discussions 
with farmers, special management may be 
required at specific sites. Local 
adjustment to management prescriptions 
allowed “with full justification”. 
̶ 
√ Periodic reforms to existing options 
after consultation. 
- 
√ New environmental 
management options often trialled 
before being introduced. 
Spatial coordination √ All participating farmers in the same 
WES+CSS were offered the same 
management prescriptions options. 
̶ ̶ 
√ Through targeting farmers managing 
(part of) the same feature. 
√ Through joint plans - 
Recruiting participants √ NE devolved recruitment to their 
Local Teams. National Park authorities 
(government bodies) may become 
involved as and where appropriate. 
̶ ̶ 
√ NE - 
√ National Park Authorities, 
landlords and/or conservation 
NGOs may be involved, especially 
where no Commoners/Grazing 
Association exists. 
Contracting individual 
farmers 
√ NE signed agreements on common 
land with a representative of the 
participants. The actual management 
prescriptions were agreed on an 
individual basis. 
̶ ̶ 
√ External contract between NE and an 
individual representative acting on 
behalf of all stakeholders. 
√ Supported by an internal agreement 
between stakeholders. 
√ Internal agreement involves land 
owners, which may be non-
farmers. 
Extension ̶ ̶̶ ̶ 
- - - 
Organising exchange 
and learning 
√ Farmers had to keep records of all 
management activities. These records 
were used to monitor results, inform 
future decisions and to facilitate the 
partnership. 
̶ ̶ 
- Farmers need to keep records of all 
management activities. No formal, 
organised exchange and learning. 
- - 
Monitoring of results √ Annual visits from EN/NE staff. 
Biological monitoring in visits by NE 
Local Teams, who identify necessary 
management changes. 
̶ ̶ 
√ HR8 monitored through records of 
meetings. HLS agreements have pre-
specified Indicators of Success (IoS). 
Field based evaluations. 
√ HR8 monitored through records of 
meetings 
- 
Control √ No payments released before results of 
annual monitoring visit. Control in 
accordance with EU regulations. 
̶ ̶ 
√ Payment only when IoS have been 
achieved 
- - 
Payment 
√ Annual, standard (flat rate) payments 
for each management prescription were 
̶ 
 
̶ 
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 Governance tasks 
Government 
(public) 
Private parties 
Farmer group Third parties 
derived from a “model farm”. Payment 
for capital work on a one-off basis. 
√ HR8 is a flat rate/ha payment. A single 
payments made to each group, twice a 
year. 
√ Distribution among group members: 
stakeholder’s share depends on the terms 
in the internal agreement. 
- 
Evaluation √ Lessons learned extended the existing 
knowledge base within EN/NE 
- ̶ 
√ HLS: no HR8 option specific 
evaluation. 
- - 
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Table A4: Table with governance tasks for SRK case in the previous situation before establishment of SRK (top cells per task), compared to 
the current situation with Stiftung Rheinische Kulturlandschaft initiating and coordinating projects (bottom cells per task). 
 Governance tasks 
Government 
(public) 
Private parties 
Farmer group SRK Third parties 
Goal setting at 
landscape level 
√ Land use and landscape plans at 
Länder level, regional level and local 
level 
- 
√ Various parties involved in 
consultation 
√ Unchanged √ SRK tailors projects to fit with plans √ Unchanged  
Design of scheme √ Larger programmes and funding 
schemes at Länder level 
- - 
√ Unchanged √ Project development by SRK 
√ Relevant parties (NGOs, 
businesses) are consulted in project 
development 
Design of on-farm 
measures  
√ Agricultural/ nature conservation 
authority 
- - 
√ If co-funding comes from a 
municipality, they determine the 
measures, or co-develop them with SRK 
√ Partially - 
Spatial coordination √ - - 
√ Unchanged for AES and VNS 
measures 
√ Based on target habitats, spatial 
coherence of habitats is actively 
promoted by SRK 
- 
Recruiting participants √ Schemes were announced and farmers 
decided to enrol or not 
- - 
- Unchanged for AES and VNS 
measures, but in SRK project, this task 
is covered by SRK 
√ One time per project. There could be 
several recruitment drives for longer 
projects or where extension is granted. 
- 
Contracting individual 
farmers 
√ - - 
 - (In SRK projects, this task is covered 
by SRK) 
√ As part of the project - 
Extension 
√ On nature conservation topics - 
√ Chamber of Agriculture on 
agricultural topics 
- 
√ Advice relating to projects and 
conservation issues 
- 
Organising exchange/ 
learning 
√ At very limited scale - - 
- 
√ Organising regular conferences and 
field trips 
- 
Monitoring of results 
- - 
√ Monitoring often contracted out 
to consultants 
- √ In some of its projects  
√ Consultants/ independent experts 
are contracted to undertake 
monitoring according to project 
plan 
Control √ - - 
- √ Of implemented measures - 
Payment √ - - 
- 
√ On condition of successful 
implementation 
- 
Evaluation √ - - 
√ The organisation(s) who funded the 
project 
- √ 
Legend: VNS = Vertragsnaturschutz (conservation agreements) with funding according to Länder directives  
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Table A5: Table with governance tasks in the WLD case in the previous situation (top cells per task): before establishment of last policy 
change in the agri-environment scheme, compared to the current situation (bottom cells per task) 
 Governance tasks 
Government 
(public) 
Private parties 
Farmer group WLD Third parties 
Goal setting at 
landscape level √ Provincial government (designating 
areas and conservation targets) 
- 
√ Landschap Noord-Holland (LNH) 
 
√ The province designs area plans (goal 
setting 
- √ Unchanged 
Design of scheme 
√ National government. ̶ ̶ 
√ The national government is 
responsible for legal setting. Regional 
water board (e.g. ditches); Provinces 
have played a role in developing the 
Catalogue Green and Blue services 
 
√ WLD (together with other farmer 
groups within a national organisation 
called Foundation Collective 
Agricultural Nature Management, 
SCAN). SCAN played an important 
role in setting up the governance system 
(e.g. certification of working methods 
of collectives) and was subsidized by 
the Dutch government. 
√ Experts were hired as consultant 
Design of on-farm 
measures  
√ Provincial governments and central 
state; and Farmers have had an advising 
role in design of measures. 
̶ 
√ Experts were often involved as 
advisor 
- Province negotiates with WLD based 
on WLD proposal 
√ WLD is responsible for developing 
measures; They are taken from the 
Catalogue Green and Blue services or 
adapted from it (tailor-made). 
√ Experts are often involved as 
advisor 
Spatial coordination √ - - 
- √ WLD - 
Recruiting participants √ Official role √ Informal role - 
- √ WLD - 
Contracting individual 
farmers 
√ Province after a check by the Dutch 
paying agency whether individual 
applications for agri-environmental 
contracts were in compliance with the 
regional management plan. 
̶ --̶ 
- √ WLD - 
Extension 
̶ 
√ WLD has field coordinators who are 
contact points (communication) & 
advisors for farmers 
√ LNH trains volunteers for 
monitoring 
- √ unchanged √ unchanged 
Organising exchange 
and learning 
̶ 
√ WLD: Newsletters, meetings, and 
education 
√ Local environmental groups 
discuss best management practices 
for grassland use and predation 
control 
- √ unchanged - 
Monitoring of results 
√ The province is responsible for the 
monitoring of conservation results 
√ Volunteers: about 650 volunteers 
assist the farmers in tracing, marking, 
registering and protecting the nests 
(volunteers are shared with LNH) 
- 
- 
√ WLD takes responsibility for the 
monitoring of conservation results with 
the aid of volunteers and consultancies 
- Consultancies are involved, but 
not responsible 
Control √ Food and Consumer Product Safety 
Authority of individual farmers: 
Scheme enforcement by selective field 
inspections 
- No official role, but WLD has a 
committee that checks if farmers 
comply with contract 
̶ 
- National Food and Consumer Product 
Safety Authority controls farmer group 
√ WLD is now officially responsible for 
control of individual farmers 
- 
Payment to farmers 
√ Dutch paying agency paid individual 
farmers.  
√ Unlike most AECs, WLD made 
individual contracts with participating 
farmers for redistributing money that 
they had received from the Dutch 
paying agency (to have results based 
payments) 
̶ 
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 Governance tasks 
Government 
(public) 
Private parties 
Farmer group WLD Third parties 
√ The province commissions the Dutch 
paying agency to only approve group 
applications of group that are in 
accordance with the regional plan 
√ WLD pays individual farmers and can 
decide herself on payment framework 
 
- 
Evaluation 
√ Province and national government 
- No formal role, but WLD influenced 
the change of the system 
√ Research institutes commissioned 
by government 
√ Province - WLD evaluates at management level √ Unchanged 
*** Source: OECD 2013 (Table 13.1) 
 
